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The role of trust on economic growth and the efficiency of large organizations has been 
 
well documented in the literature. For example, LaPorta et al., (1997, 1999) provide evidence 
 
linking trust and the success of large organizations and the efficiency of government. A related 
 
body of work has explored the link between trust and growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997) and 
 
patterns of trade/investment flows amongst European nations (Guiseo, Sapienza, and Zingales, 
 
2009). Taken in its totality, this body of work shows the central importance of trust on economic 
 
development and societal well-being. Intuitively, trust provides a means to facilitate economic 
 
activity as it reduces an important barrier to trade – the need to undertake costly efforts to learn 
 
about the trustworthiness of others (Zak and Knack, 2001). 
 
A related construct used to measure life-satisfaction and social welfare is the notion of 
 
subjective well-being. Subjective well-being has been shown to provide a reliable indicator of 
 
well-being (Krueger and Schkade, 2008) and has been shown to reflect changes in income or 
 
material living standards (Sacks et al., 2010). Moreover, the notion of subjective well-being has 
 
been used to measure the impact of various policy measures such as German re-unification 
 
(Frijters et al., 2004) and cigarette taxes (Gruber and Mullainathan, 2005) on the target 
 
population of interest. 
 
The importance for trust on economic growth and the link between measures of 
 
subjective well-being and material living standards is particularly noteworthy for nations such as 
 
Pakistan where citizens have been exposed to militancy and severe conflict over the past 
 
decades. Exposure to conflict has been shown to erode both general levels of trust (see e.g., 
 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Alesina and LaFerrara, 2002) and measures of subjective well-being (see, 
 
e.g., Frey et al., 2009; Dolan and Metcalfe, 2011). The first aim of this report, is to explore the 
 
extent to which exposure to conflict impacts such measures for those living in Khyber 
 
Paktunkwa (KPK) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) – regions that have 
 
been hit particularly hard by conflict and radical militancy. 
 
A second aim of this project is to evaluate the impact of government reforms designed to 
 
(i) strengthen human rights, (ii) increase the transparency of the government, and (iii) improve 
 
the performance of the civil sector. Such reforms were enacted as part of an on-going 
 






growth and trust in the government as a means to counter radicalism/prevent future acts of 
 
militancy. Before proceeding, we should note that we are unable to measure such outcomes 
 
directly given the relatively short time-horizon of our study. Rather we focus on the impact of 
 
such reforms on precursors of economic growth and political trust. 
 
To accomplish our aims, we collect survey data from a repeated cross-section of the adult 
 
population in both KPK and FATA. Our data collection efforts combine information gathered 
 
via both a longer, in-person questionnaire administered by researchers from the University of 
 
Peshawar and a shorter sets of questions that was administered by a robot caller. The first wave 
 
of data collection was initiated during the fall of 2014 and the second approximately six months 
 
later during the spring of 2015. Importantly, these waves spanned a targeted messaging 
 
campaign that was designed to make salient the government reforms of interest along with the 
underlying motivation for the given reform.1 The messaging campaign was initiated during the 
winter of 2015 and relied upon robo-calls delivered to a subset of all cell-phone numbers in 
 
randomly selected tehsils throughout KPK and FATA. 
 
Although the ideal identification strategy would rely upon a random roll-out of the 
 
reforms across tehsils, we believe that our approach provides a viable alternative given the 
 
growing body of work showing that targeted messages are powerful tools to promote a variety of 
 
behaviors such as energy and water conservation (Allcott, 2008; Ferraro and Price, 2013; Kahn 
 
and Wolak, 2013; Ito et al., 2015) or charitable contributions (Shang and Croson, 2010; List et 
 
al., 2015). Perhaps more important, similar effects have been shown in the context of tax 
 
compliance (Kleven et al., 2012; Hallsworth et al., 2014) and other instances where the message 
 
(information of interest) was transmitted by the government directly (e.g., Kling et al., 2011; 
 
Liebman and Luttmer, 2011). 
 
Empirical results provide mixed evidence on effectiveness of our messaging campaign. 
 
While the messages impact measures of trust, subjective well-being and perceptions about the 
 
quality of service delivery in KPK, there is no effect of the campaign on respondents in FATA. 
 
Importantly, however, such effects are more pronounced amongst those who have been exposed 
 
to conflict during the past year. Moreover, given prior work linking political trust to an 
 
individual’s confidence in government institutions as captured by perceptions of quality and 
 
1 
It is important to note that our approach thus does not allow us to measure the impact of the underlying reforms 
per se. Rather, our approach relies upon the assumption that the messages make salient such reforms and thus 





performance (see, e.g., Hetherington, 2005; Newton, 2007; Hutchison and Johnson, 2015), the 
 
impact of our awareness campaign on reported satisfaction with civil service delivery and 
 
perceptions about the quality of the justice and governance systems is noteworthy and provides a 
 
necessary first step in rebuilding overall trust in the state. 
 
II. Study Design and Messaging Campaign 
 
The aim of our empirical analysis is twofold. First, we set forth to examine how 
 
exposure to conflict impacts (i) general levels of trust, (ii) attitudes towards various public and 
 
religious institutions, and (iii) measures of overall life-satisfaction. There is a growing body of 
 
work showing that exposure to conflict serves to erode both general levels of trust (see e.g., 
 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Alesina and LaFerrara, 2002) and measures of subjective well-being (see, 
 
e.g., Frey et al., 2009; Dolan and Metcalfe, 2011). However, we are unaware of any work 
 
exploring how exposure to conflict impacts such measures in the context of Pakistan and regions 
 
such as Khyber Paktunkwa (KPK) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) where 
 
citizens have been exposed to continued militancy and conflict for more than two decades. 
 
Second, we want to explore whether targeted messages designed to make citizens aware 
 
of government reforms that aim to increase transparency, improve service delivery, and 
 
strengthen the protection of private property/human rights influence overall levels of trust and 
 
attitudes towards public institutions that are integral for economic development in the region. 
 
Importantly, such messages will allow us to evaluate whether and how perceptions about the 
 
quality and performance of government institutions impacts overall levels of political trust – a 
 
key outcome under the PCNA. 
 
To accomplish these aims, we designed an in-person survey that was conducted in 
 
randomly selected villages throughout Kyber Pakhtunkwa and the Federally Administered Tribal 
 
Areas. Copies of the survey for each region are included in Appendix A. The in-person survey 
 
was administered in two waves by our partners from the University of Peshawar. The first wave 
 
of data collection was done in the fall of 2014 prior to our messaging campaign while the second 
 




Table 1 lists the villages in each region that were included in our survey along with 
 
information on; (i) the number of responses per village in each wave, (ii) an indicator for 
 






was randomly assigned to receive the various messages that were included in our study design. 
 
As noted in the table, we administered a total of 3,741 surveys across 34 villages located in 8 
 
tehsils throughout KPK – 1,823 during the first wave of data collection and 1,918 during the 
 
second wave. Of these villages, 10 were located in urban areas and the remaining 24 were 
 
located in rural areas of the province. 
 
Our final sample from FATA includes 1,814 unique respondents drawn from 19 rural 
 
villages. Of these surveys, 893 were completed during the first wave of data collection and the 
 
remaining 921 during the second wave. Although we visited the same set of villages in both 
 
waves of the survey, the final data set is comprised of a repeated cross-section with a unique set 
 
of households included in each wave of the survey. 
 
To expand the scope of these data collection efforts, we complemented the in-person 
 
survey with a shorter questionnaire (Appendix B) that was administered using robot callers. 
 
Importantly, the phone survey allowed us to sample individuals living in villages that were 
 
inaccessible to our survey team due to military action or other forms of conflict. Table 2 lists the 
 
tehsils in each region that were included in the phone survey along with information on; (i) the 
 
number of respondents per tehsil in each wave, (ii) an indicator for whether or not villages from 
 
the given tehsil were included in the in-person survey, and (iii) an indicator for whether the tehsil 
 
was randomly assigned to receive the various messages that were included in our study design. 
 
As noted in the table, we administered a total of 30,473 phone surveys across 46 tehsils 
 
located throughout KPK – 15,005 during the first wave of data collection and 15,468 during the 
 
second wave. Of these tehsils, 8 included villages that were sampled as part of our in-person 
 
survey. Our final sample for FATA includes data from 9,748 individuals drawn from 12 distinct 
 
tehsils – 4,874 surveys conducted during each wave of data collection. Of the 12 tehsils included 
 




The Awareness Campaigns – Why Targeted Messages 
 
A growing body of work suggests that targeted messages and normative appeals are 
 
powerful tools to promote a variety of behaviors such as energy and water conservation (Allcott, 
 
2008; Ferraro and Price, 2013; Kahn and Wolak, 2013; Ito et al., 2015); charitable contributions 
 








et al., 2014). We build upon this literature to design a series of targeted messages that make 
 
salient a number of government reforms and the underlying motivation for such. 
 
The messages were disseminated via text message and/or robot calls to a random sample 
 
of cell phone holders throughout KPK and FATA. Delivery of the messages occurred between 
 
the first and the second wave of our in-person and phone surveys. As we observe surveys in 
 
areas that receive our targeted messages and others that do not receive the messages, we are able 
 
to use difference in differences methods to explore how trust and attitudes towards various 
 
institutions are impacted by awareness of government programs designed to (i) increase the 
 
transparency and/or efficiency of the local government, (ii) strengthen the rights of citizens, and 
 
(iii) provide citizens an easy way to file and track complaints should they believe their rights 
 
were violated. To the extent that such campaigns exogenously shock beliefs about the strength 
 
of local institutions and individual rights, our approach thus allows us to identify the importance 
 
of such beliefs on overall levels of trust and attitudes towards public institutions. 
 
Reforms and Messages in KPK 
 
The messaging campaigns in KPK focused on three distinct government reforms; (i) the 
 
Right to Information Act, (ii) the Right to Services Act, and (iii) an e-Grievance system 
 
established as part of the Peshawar High Court. The Right to Information Act (RTI) was passed 
 
by the provincial assembly in October of 2013 and assented to by the governor in November of 
 
that same year. The objective of the RTI was to ensure that citizens were provided access to 
 
information about issues of public importance and thus increase the transparency of government. 
 
To achieve this aim, the act created an electronic platform for citizens to submit requests for 
 
information and an independent commission to oversee such requests and ensure that they are 
processed in a timely manner.2 
The Right to Services Act (RTS) was passed by the provincial assembly in January 2014 
 
and assented to by the governor in that same month. The objective of the RTS was to ensure 
 
improved public service delivery. To achieve this aim, the act established time limits and other 
 
requirements for the delivery of various public services and penalties for civil servants that fail to 
 












allows citizens to file on-line complaints if they believe that a public servant failed to meet the 
pre-specified guidelines.3 
The e-Grievance redress system was established by the human rights directorate of the 
 
Peshawar High Court in conjunction with the World Bank. The objective of the e-Grievance 
 
system was to establish an on-line platform to allow citizens to file complaints related to 
 
violations of basic human rights and the dispensation of justice. The system was designed to 
 
provide two-way communication between citizens and members of the human rights directorate 
 
that allows complainants to track the progress of their claim and receive feedback on its ultimate 
dispensation.4 
To disseminate information on the various acts, we designed a series of targeted 
 
messages in conjunction with the governance support unit in KPK that were distributed via robo- 
 





…KPK’s RTI laws and commission allow you to gather information from any 
 
government office in KPK. A public commission officer has been appointed in every 
 
governmental department who will provide information about the particular department. 
 
For more information…go to www.kprti.gov.pk. Thank you… 
 
 
The initial robo-calls were immediately followed by a subsequent SMS message that varied in 
 
content but included language that focused on one of three main themes; (i) that the law affords 
 
everyone the right to know how government works, (ii) that the law was designed to ensure 
 
government transparency, or (iii) that the law allows individuals to ensure that government is 
 
working for them. The specific wording of the SMS text messages are provided in Appendix C. 
 
The messaging campaign for RTS included an initial robo-call followed by two 
 
subsequent rounds of SMS messages inquiring about the use of particular services covered under 
 







For additional information on the Right to Services Act see http://www.rts.gkp.pk/rtsweb/ 
4 






…government has passed the Right to Services Act 2013 which now ensures that citizens 
 
should get certain services as a right without inconvenience or facing coercion….You can 
 
contribute to strengthening this system by answering a few short questions regarding your 
 
use of any of these services… 
 
 
The recipient was then provided a list of services covered under the act and asked to press 1 if 
 
they had used any of the services in the past three months and would like to provide feedback on 
 
their experience. Those who pressed one were sent a follow up text asking them to indicate 
 
which services they had accessed in the past three months. This was followed by a second text 
 
asking them to describe their experience. 
 
The messaging campaign for the e-Grievance redress system followed a similar protocol 
 
to that for the Right to Information act. A random subset of cell phone holders in a tehsil 
 
received a robo-call that in part reads: 
 
 
…The High Court has established a system where you can record your grievance if you 
 





The call closes by asking the recipient if they believe that (i) their rights have been violated and 
 
would like to use the new service, (ii) their rights have been violated but would not like to file a 
 
complaint using the new service, or (iii) their rights have not been violated and thus do not feel 
 
the need to use the service at the current time. 
 
Reforms and Messages in FATA 
 
The messaging campaign in FATA focused on a single government reform – the 
 
introduction of an anti-corruption hotline to allow individuals to file and subsequently track 
claims with the Governor’s Inspection Team (GIT).5      Specifically, the anti-corruption hotline 
allows citizens to submit complaints related to (i) incidences of financial abuse or bribery, (ii) 
 
misuse of authority or fraudulent practices, and (iii) failure in the delivery of basic services. 
 














To disseminate information about the establishment of the anti-corruption hotline, the 
 
messaging campaign includes two rounds of robo-calls followed by up to two additional rounds 
 
of SMS text messages. For the first round of robo-calls, randomly selected cell phone numbers 
 
throughout FATA received a voice message that in part reads: 
 
 
…In order to improve governance and delivery of basic services in FATA, the 
 
Government intends to involve FATA residents in this process to build their ownership 
 
and take measure to ensure good governance and provision of basic services…. 
 
 
Less than a week later, a subset of the initial recipients was sent a second voice message 
 
providing additional detail on the anti-corruption hotline. This second message in part read: 
 
 
…the Governor’s Inspection Team has launched a complaint redressal hotline that allows 
 
you to file complaints if you have personally faced or have knowledge of incidences of 
 
bribery, financial misappropriations in development projects, fraudulent distribution of 
 
public funds, misuse of authority, or especially failure in the provision of basic services 
 
in Agencies and FR regions…. 
 
 
The voice message was followed immediately by an SMS text providing the phone number and 
 




Recipients of the second voice message were subsequently set an additional text message 
 
providing a list of services covered under the act and asked if they had used any of the services 
 
in the past three months and would like to provide feedback on their experience. Those who 
 
indicated that they had used one of the listed services and were willing to provide feedback were 
 
sent a final text providing a list of options to describe their experience – e.g., the service was 
 
provided without delay and met expectations, the service was provided after receipt of a bribe, or 
 
the provision of the service was denied completely. The exact scripts for the voice messages and 
 






Experimental Design - KPK 
 
Prior to the start of our experiment and the initial wave of data collection, the 48 tehsils 
 
throughout KPK were randomly assigned to either a control group that received no messages 
 
about the various reforms or one of seven treatment groups that received messages providing 
 
information about some subset of the reforms. The messaging campaign was initiated during the 
 
second week of December 2014 and continued through the remainder of the month. 
 
Table C1 in the appendix provides detail on which tehsils were assigned to the various 
 
treatment groups along with information the tehsil’s population in 2013 and the number of 
 
individuals within that tehsil who received messages of a given type. As noted in the table, only 
 
a fraction of residents in any tehsil received our messages as our partners in the governance 
 
support unit had a limited budget for the messaging campaign. For example, approximately 1.8 
 




In treatment groups where residents received information on more than one reform, the 
 
recipients of any one message represent independent draws from the set of known cell phone 
 
numbers for recipients in the tehsil. For example, in Lahore, approximately 1.7 percent of the 
 
nearly 475,000 residents received information about the right to information act and another 1.2 
 
percent received information about the right to services act. In this regard, we observe variation 
 
in both the intensity of treatment within a tehsil and the range of reforms that were advertised 
 
during our messaging campaign. 
 
Experimental Design - FATA 
 
Prior to the start of our experiment and the initial wave of data collection, the twenty four 
 
subdivisions throughout FATA were randomly assigned to either a control group that received 
 
no information about the anti-corruption hotline or one of two treatment groups – one who 
 
received the initial voice message and subsequent SMS texts and a second that received both 
 
voice messages and the subsequent SMS texts. The messaging campaign was initiated during 
 
the last week of February 2015 and continued through the second week of March. 
 
Table D1 in the appendix provides detail on which subdivisions were assigned to the 
 
various treatment groups along with information on the agency/frontier region in which the 
 
subdivision is located, the subdivision’s population in 2013, and the number of individuals 
 






fraction of residents in any subdivision received our messages as our partners in the governance 
 
support unit had a limited budget for the messaging campaign. For example, approximately 2.8 
 
percent of the 597,350 residents in the Khar subdivision received our initial voice message and 
 
subsequent SMS text messages. 
 
III. Survey Results and the Determinants of Trust - KPK 
 
We begin by exploring the role of conflict and our experimental interventions on overall 
 
levels of trust and beliefs about the fairness or intentions of others in KPK. To do so, we follow 
 
the prior literature (e.g., Alesina and LaFerrara, 2002; Glaeser et al., 2000) and rely upon three 
 
questions borrowed from the General Social Survey. Overall levels of trust are measured based 
 
on response to the question: “Generally speaking would you say that most people can be trusted 
 
or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” Beliefs about the fairness of others are 
 
measured using response to the question: “Do you think most people would try to take advantage 
 
of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?” And, beliefs about the intentions of 
 
others are measures using response to the question: “Would you say that most of the time people 
 
are trying to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves?” 
 
Table 3 provides summary statistics for these questions for two subsamples of interest – 
 
individuals who have been exposed to violence in the past year and those who have not been 
 
exposed to violence over this period – from the first wave of the survey in KPK. To identify 
 
exposure to violence, we develop an indicator based upon response to question #45 of the 
 
survey: “How much violence have you or a member of your family witnessed over the past 
year?”6 As noted in the table, exposure to violence serves to erode trust; respondents exposed to 
violence are approximately 6.9 percentage points less likely to report that others can be trusted. 
This finding shares similarity with Alesina and LaFerrara (2002) who show lower levels of trust 
 
amongst those with a recent history of trauma. 
 
We observe similar impacts of exposure to violence on beliefs about the fairness and 
 
intentions of others. Respondents exposed to violence are 9.5 percentage points less likely to 
 
report that others would try to be fair and 5.7 percentage points less likely to report that others 
 
are helpful. Importantly, all three of these differences are statistically significant at the p < 0.05 
 
level using a test of proportions. 
 
6 
Specifically, we consider two indicators for exposure; (i) anyone who reports exposure greater than the sample 
mean and (ii) anyone who reports exposure greater than one-standard deviation above the sample mean. The 
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Having shown that exposure to conflict impacts attitudinal measures of trust and beliefs 
 
about others, we next explore the effect of our messaging campaigns and awareness of the 
 
underlying reforms they outline on these same measures. To do so, we exploit the repeated 
 
nature of our survey and the fact that only a subset of the villages in the sample received 
 
messages. Importantly, this allows us to estimate a difference-in-differences model to isolate the 
 
impact of our messaging campaign from other macro level changes in the region that could also 
 
impact the attitudes of interest. 
 
Specifically, we estimate a series of linear probability models of the form: 
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽0𝑇 + 𝛽 𝑊 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑊 + 𝛾𝑋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
where, yit is the response of interest for individual i in wave t, Ti is an indicator variable that 
 
equal one if the respondent resides in a village that received targeted messages, Wt is an indicator 
 
variable that equals one if the survey is from the second wave (the post-intervention period), and 
 
Xit is a vector of demographic variables for the respondent. To account for correlation in 
 
responses within a village, we cluster standard errors at the village level. Within this set-up, β2 is 
 




Empirical results are contained in Table 4 and provide evidence that our messaging 
 
campaigns increased trust and beliefs about others. For example, consider results from the first 
 
column of the table which explores the determinants of trust in others. As noted in the table, 
 
respondents from treated villages are approximately 32 percentage points less likely to indicate 
 
that others can be trusted in the initial wave of our survey than are counterparts in the control 
 
villages. However, in the post-intervention period, respondents from treated villages are 
 
approximately 11 percentage points more likely than counterparts in control villages to indicate 
 
that others can be trusted. Importantly, the resulting difference in differences effect is significant 
 
at the p < 0.01 level suggesting that our messaging campaigns had a positive impact on trust. 
 
We observe a similar effect of our messages on beliefs that others are helpful. As noted 
 
in the fifth column of the table, respondents from treated villages are approximately 14.1 
 











others try to be helpful in the initial survey wave. However, this difference falls by more than 82 
percent in the post-intervention period – a change that is significant at the p < 0.05 level.7 
Having shown that our messaging campaign influences trust, we next explore whether the 
 
effects are more pronounced amongst those who have been exposed to violence. To do so, we 
 
augment our baseline regression model to include our indicator for exposure to violence, the 
 
interaction of this term with our indicator for the second wave of the survey, and the triple 
 
interaction term that equals one for a respondent living in a treated village that was exposed to 
 
violence and interviewed during the second wave of our survey. Results for these specifications 
 
are included in the even numbered columns of Table 4 and suggest that treatment has a larger 
 
effect on respondents who were exposed to violence. However, this difference is only significant 
 
when considering the impact of treatment on the belief that others are helpful. 
 
Importantly, these results suggest that the underlying reforms, or more precisely, 
 
awareness of such, serves to mitigate the impact of conflict on trust and trustworthiness. From a 
 
policy perspective, such heterogeneity is noteworthy given prior work suggesting that lower 
 
levels of social capital (trust) are associated with increased rates of crime (see, e.g., Sampson et 
 
al., 1997; Wilkinson et al., 1998; Kawachi et al., 1999). As such, the awareness campaign 
 
should help advance an important objective of the PCNA – to counter insurgency and reduce the 
 
likelihood of future acts of violence. 
 
Satisfaction with Government and Trust in Specific Institutions 
 
A fundamental aim of the reforms included in our messaging campaign was to restore 
 
trust in government and improve the delivery of key public services. To explore whether our 
 
awareness campaign promoted greater satisfaction with public institutions and service delivery, 
 
we re-run our baseline difference-in-differences specification on response to the following set of 
 
questions: (i) I am satisfied with the quality of services provided by the political administration; 
 
(ii) Over the past year, the Provincial Government has taken efforts that have improved the 
 
system of justice in your district; and (iii) Over the past year, government actions have improved 
 





We observe a similar impact of treatment on response to question #52 which asks respondents to indicate the 
extent to which they believe it is wise to use caution before trusting strangers. As noted in the seventh column of 
Table 4, the differences in differences estimator for this model is negative and significant at the p < 0.01 level 
suggesting that our messaging campaign causes respondents to believe it to be less important to use caution when 





indicate on a scale from one (strongly disagree) to ten (strongly agree) the extent to which they 
 
agreed with the given statement. 
 
Empirical results from these models are presented in Table 5 and suggest that our 
 
awareness campaign had an impact on perceptions about the quality of public services. The DiD 
 
estimator in column 1 of the table (2.85) is equivalent to an approximate one-standard deviation 
 
increase in reported satisfaction with the quality of services provided by the public administrator. 
 
We observe smaller, and statistically insignificant, effects of our awareness campaign on 
perceived changes in the quality of the justice and governance systems.8 
Exploring these results a level deeper by expanding our baseline specification to include 
 
controls for exposure to violence, we see that the effect of treatment on perceptions about the 
 
quality of public services is greater for agents that have been exposed to violence in the past 
 
year. As noted in the second column of the table, the impact of our awareness campaign is 
 
approximately 50 percent larger than that observed for counterparts in treated villages who were 
 




Interestingly, while we find that our awareness campaign has no impact on perceived 
 
changes in the quality of the justice system or system of governance in the region, exposure to 
 
conflict does impact such perceptions. As noted in the fourth and sixth columns of the table, the 
 
coefficients on our indicators for exposure to violence correspond to an approximate third of a 
 
standard deviation (fifth of a standard deviation) increase in perceived improvements in the 
 
justice system (system of governance). 
 
Given prior work linking political trust to an individual’s confidence in government 
 
institutions as captured by perceptions of quality and performance (see, e.g., Hetherington, 2005; 
 
Newton, 2007; Hutchison and Johnson, 2015), the impact of our awareness campaign on 
 
reported satisfaction with civil service delivery and perceptions about the quality of the justice 
 
and governance systems is noteworthy. Such changes represent a necessary first step in 
 
rebuilding trust in the state and associated government institutions. 
 
Having shown that our awareness campaign and exposure to violence have an impact on 
 




The qualitative nature of our findings are unchanged if we use an ordered probit model to examine our outcomes 





governance and justice systems, we next explore how these same factors influence confidence in 
 
various public and religious institutions. Specifically, we examine trust in seven distinct 
 
institutions; (i) the mosque, (ii) the municipality, (iii) the police department, (iv) the district 
 
court, (v) state media, (vi) the federal government, and (vii) the civil services. To do so, we 
 
asked respondents to indicate on a scale from one (no confidence) to ten (very high confidence) 
 
the amount of confidence they had in the given institution and use these responses as the 
 
dependent variable in our baseline econometric model. 
 
Empirical results are presented in Table 6 and suggest that our awareness campaign 
 
increased confidence in local institutions such as the district court and the municipality but had 
 
no impact on confidence in national (the federal government) or religious (the mosque) 
 
institutions. For example, the estimated coefficient on our DiD term of interest in column seven 
 
(2.01) corresponds to an approximate 0.8 standard deviation increase in reported confidence in 
 
the district court. In contrast, the estimated coefficients for the DiD terms for our models 
 
exploring confidence in the mosque (column 1) and federal government (column 11) are small – 
 
approximately one-fifth of a standard deviation – and statistically insignificant. 
 
Such a pattern of results is comforting as the reforms highlighted in our messaging 
 
campaign were passed at the provincial level and should thus have no impact on confidence in 
 
federal or religious institutions. It thus appears as if the differential changes we observe for 
 
treated villages relative to control villages in the post-intervention period is driven by our 
 
awareness campaign rather than unobserved village level shocks. Moreover, political trust is a 
 
learned behavior that captures perceptions across a wide array of services that are formed over a 
 
long time horizon (Ridley, 1997; Newton, 2007). That our awareness campaign had but small 
 
effects on trust in institutions such as the municipality and the civil service is to be expected. 
 
Rebuilding trust in such institutions requires time. 
 
Happiness and Measures of Subjective Well-Being 
 
We next explore the impact of exposure to conflict and our awareness campaigns on 
 
measures of subjective well-being. Subjective well-being has been shown to provide a reliable 
 
indicator of well-being (Krueger and Schkade, 2008) and has been used to measure the impact of 
 
various policy measures such as German re-unification (Frijters et al., 2004) and cigarette taxes 
 
(Gruber and Mullainathan, 2005) on the target population of interest. Given prior work showing 
 






well-being (e.g., Frey et al., 2009; Dolan and Metcalfe, 2011), it is thus worthwhile to examine 
 
the effect of our awareness campaign on measures of subjective well-being and if such effects 
 
are more pronounced amongst those who have been exposed to conflict. 
 
To explore these relationships, we utilize the following two questions in our survey; (i) 
 
All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days and (ii) How 
 
satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household. For each question, the 
 
respondent was asked to indicate their current level of satisfaction on a scale from one (very 
 
dissatisfied) to ten (very satisfied) and used these responses as the dependent variable in our 
 
baseline econometric models. 
 
Empirical results are contained in Table 7 and suggest that our awareness campaign had 
 
but a negligible impact on well-being for the population as a whole. As noted in the first and 
 
third columns of the table, the coefficient on our DiD estimator is positive but neither the 
 
approximate one-third standard deviation increase in satisfaction with one’s financial situation 
 
nor the approximate one-seventh of a standard deviation increase in overall life satisfaction is 
 
significant at meaningful levels. Taken jointly, these results suggest that while our awareness 
 
campaign appears to impact trust and confidence in local institution, these changes do not 
 
promote increased life satisfaction. 
 
However, when we expand our baseline model to include controls for exposure to 
 
violence and allow the effect of our awareness campaign to differ across those exposed to 
 
violence and those who were not, we find important heterogeneity. Whereas the messages had 
 
little impact on those with no exposure to violence, the DiD estimator for those who reported 
 
prior exposure corresponds to just over a half a standard deviation increase in our measure of 
 




An Important Robustness Check – The Phone Survey 
 
Although suggestive, there are a number of reasons why one may be skeptical of the 
 
results from our in-person survey. First and foremost, the survey was conducted in a small 
 
number of villages and includes observations from but a single control tehsil. We are thus 
 
unable to disentangle unobserved shocks to villages within our control tehsil from the effect of 
 
the messaging campaign on villages within treated tehsils. Second, give the small sample sizes 
 






surveys may be subject to desirability bias or other effects reflecting characteristics of the 
 
surveyor rather than the respondent. 
 
To address these concerns, we conducted a phone based survey that included three 
 
questions relating to; (i) overall life satisfaction, (ii) trust in others, and (iii) satisfaction with 
 
public services delivered by the local government – that were answered using a five-point Likert 
 
scale. As the phone survey did not include questions pertaining to exposure to violence, we 
 
restrict attention to our baseline econometric specification to recover the effect of our awareness 
 
campaign on the outcomes of interest. Furthermore, we do not observe the respondents village 
 




Empirical results are presented in Table 8 and provide evidence consonant with that from 
 
our in-person surveys. For example, as noted in the second and third columns of the table, the 
 
awareness campaign caused an approximate two-fifth of a standard deviation increase in trust 
 
towards others and an approximate one-third of a standard deviation increase in satisfaction with 
 
service delivery – differences that are both significant at the p < 0.05 level. Importantly, such 
 
effects are qualitatively similar to those observed in our in-person survey data whereby the 
 
awareness campaign increased the likelihood that respondent’s indicated that they trusted others 
 
and the perceived quality of public services. 
 
However, unlike data from the in-person surveys which suggested no effect of treatment 
 
on overall life-satisfaction, we do find a significant treatment effect in the phone survey. As 
 
noted in the first column of Table 8, the awareness campaign leads to an approximate one-sixth 
 
of a standard deviation increase in reported life-satisfaction. Interestingly, the estimated 
 
treatment effect is similar in magnitude to that identified in the in-person survey (one-seventh of 
 
a standard deviation). This suggests that concerns regarding sample size and the power of our 
 
in-person surveys may have some validity and highlights the benefits of including the phone 
 
survey as a robustness check. 
 
IV. Survey Results and the Determinants of Trust - FATA 
 
We next explore the role of conflict and our experimental interventions on overall levels 
 
of trust and beliefs about the fairness or intentions of others in FATA. In doing so, we follow the 
 
same basic structure of analysis as used to analyze the KPK survey data. As such, we begin by 
 






beliefs about others. Table 9 presents the summary statistics detailing this relationship for the 
 
first wave of our survey in FATA. Interestingly, we find the exposure to conflict is associated 
 
with higher levels of trust and beliefs about the motives of others – the opposite of what was 
 
found amongst survey respondents in KPK. For example, as noted in the table, individuals who 
 
have been exposed to violence are approximately 7.3 percentage points more likely to indicate 
 
that others can be trusted and 17.9 percentage points more likely to report that others would try 
 
to be fair – differences that are significant at the p < 0.10 and p < 0.01 levels respectively. 
 
Having shown that exposure to conflict impacts attitudinal measures of trust and beliefs 
 
about others, we next explore the effect of our messaging campaign and awareness of the anti- 
 
corruption hotline on these same measures. To do so, we estimate our baseline econometric 
 
model to explore the factors that determine responses to the three trust questions. Results for 
 
these models are contained in Table 10 and suggest that treatment has no impact on the belief 
 
that others can be trusted or are fair. While the estimated DiD coefficient for both of these 
 
models is positive, neither estimate is statistically significant at meaningful levels. 
 
Examining these findings a level deeper to allow heterogeneity in the impact of the 
 
awareness campaign across those who have been exposed to violence in the past year and those 
 
who have not, we find a similar set of null results. Our awareness campaign had no meaningful 
 
impact on either type of respondent. Taken in its totality, these data suggest that awareness 
 
campaigns highlighting the introduction of the anti-corruption hotline had no impact on overall 
levels of trust or beliefs about the motives of others.9 However, in interpreting these results it is 
important to note that there was less of a time lapse between our awareness campaign and 
 
follow-up surveys in FATA. Moreover, the underlying reform of interest reflected a 
 
modification to an existing program (the Governor’s Inspection Team) rather than the 
 
introduction of new policies/programs as in the case of KPK. 
 
Satisfaction with Government and Trust in Specific Institutions 
 
We next explore the extent to which our awareness campaign impacts the perceived 
 
quality of public services along with perceptions about improvements in governance and the 
 
justice system. To do so, we re-run our baseline difference-in-differences specification on 
 




We observe a similar set of null results if we examine the effect of our messaging campaign on measures of 





by the political administration; (ii) Over the past year, the Provincial Government has taken 
 
efforts that have improved the system of justice in your district; and (iii) Over the past year, 
 
government actions have improved the governance systems in your region. 
 
Results from these models are presented in Table 11 and suggest that the awareness 
 
campaign has no discernible impact on perceptions regarding the quality of public service or 
 
improvements in governance and justice. For example, as noted in the first column of the table, 
 
the awareness campaign caused an approximate one-sixth of a standard deviation increase in the 
 
perceived quality of public services. Yet, this effect is estimated imprecisely and not significant 
 
at any meaningful level. We observe a similar set of null effects if we expand our econometric 
 
model to allow the effect of the messaging campaign to have differential effects for those who 
 
were exposed to violence in the past year and those who were not exposed to violence over this 
 
same time horizon. 
 
We next explore how these same factors influence confidence in various public and 
 
religious institutions. Specifically, we examine trust in seven distinct institutions; (i) the 
 
mosque, (ii) the municipality, (iii) the police department, (iv) the district court, (v) state media, 
 
(vi) the federal government, and (vii) the civil services. To do so, we again asked respondents to 
 
indicate on a scale from one (no confidence) to ten (very high confidence) the amount of 
 
confidence they had in the given institution and use these responses as the dependent variable in 
 
our baseline econometric model. 
 
Empirical results are provided in Table 12 and suggest that the awareness campaign had 
 
little effect on the confidence in the municipality, the federal government, or the civil services. 
 
As noted in columns 3, 11, and 13 of the table, none of the interaction terms between the 
 
indicators for the second wave of the survey and a treated tehsil are statistically significantly at 
 
any meaningful level in models. As with other outcomes of interest, the data in Table 12 thus 
 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Citizen trust survey (FATA) questionnaire: 
 
Q1. Age (years)? 
1 = 18 – 25 
2 = 26 – 35 
3 = 36 – 45 
4 = 46 – 55 
5 = 56 – 65 
6 = 66 – 75 
7 > 75 
 
Q2. Gender 
1 = male 
2 = female 
 
Q3. Marital status 
1 = single 
2 = married 
3 = widowed 
 




1 = None 
2 = Primary school 
3 = Middle school 
4 = SSC 
5 = FA/FSc. 
6 = BA/BSc. 
7 = MA or higher 
8 = Professional degree (MBBS etc.) 




1 = Private employee 
2 = Government employee 
3 = Agriculture 
4 = Self-employed 
5 = Housewife 
6 = Jobless 











1 = Pashtun 
2 = Hindko 
3 = Chitrali 
4 = Gujjar 
5 = Hazara 
6 = Punjabi 
7 = Other 
 
Q8. What type of vehicle do you own? 
1 = car 
2 = motorcycle 
3 = bicycle 
4 = other motorized vehicle 
5 = do not own a vehicle 
 
Q9. Do you own a home? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
Q10. How much land do you own? --- in Marla 
 
Q11. Five-digit location code 
 
Q12. Many people claim that FATA has a special status due to its tribal traditions; therefore, it 
should have a special administrative arrangement. In your opinion, which of the following 
administrative structures should FATA have? 
1 = a political agent appointed by the government to maintain law and order and manage 
development in the area 
2 = an elected local government to management agency, town and village level 
development. 
3 = a combination of a political agent and an elected local government. 
4 = don’t know 
5 = does not apply to me 
6 = don’t care 
 
Q13. Many people claim that FATA has a special status due to its tribal traditions; therefore, it 
should have a special administrative arrangement. In your opinion, which of the following 
administrative structures should FATA have? 
1 = a separate province with all the provincial political and administrative structure. 
2 = merged into KPK. 
3 = remain a federally administered special entity. 
4 = don’t know 
5 = does not apply to me 






Q14. In your opinion, which of the following entities would best improve service delivery in 
your district or agency? 
1 = the government in Islamabad 
2 = provincial government officials 
3 = district or agency civil servants 
4 = community based organization 
5 = tribal councils 
6 = don’t know 
7 = does not apply to me 























































Q15. I am satisfied with the quality of the services provided by the political administration. 
 
Q16. The government is responsible for creating employment opportunities. 
 
Q17. The government does a good job of providing employment opportunities for the people in 
your village. 
 
Q18. The Office of the Political Agent is essential for development in FATA. 
 
Q19. The Office of the Political Agent is essential for maintaining peace and security. 
 
Q20. The Office of the Political Agent is essential for ensuring that there is a fair and transparent 
system of justice. 
 
Q21. Over the past year, the FATA Administration has made investments that have improved the 
schools in your district. 
 
Q22. Over the past year, the FATA Administration has made investments that have improved 
healthcare in your district. 
 
Q23. Over the past year, the FATA Administration has taken efforts that have improved the 
system of justice in your district. 
 
Q24. Over the past year, government actions s have improved the governance systems (like the 
right to information) in your region. 
 
Q25. Over the past year, federal government investments have improved large scale 
infrastructure – we should give examples here - in your region 
Q26. Over the past year, FATA Administration investments have improved the local 
infrastructure in your region. 
 
Q27. Over the past year, the federal government has taken actions that have aided the 
rehabilitation of IDPs in your region. 
 
Q28. Over the past year, the FATA Administration has taken actions that have aided the 
rehabilitation of IDPs in your region. 
 
Q29. Over the past year, the federal government has taken efforts that have helped to control 







Q30. Over the past year, the FATA Administration has taken actions that have aided the 
rehabilitation of IDPs in your region. 
 
Q31. Over the past year, the local government has taken actions that have aided the rehabilitation 
of IDPs in your region. 
 








Rate your confidence in the following institutions: 
 












Q37. State media 
 
Q38. Private media 
 
Q39. Government in Islamabad 
 




























































Q46. How often have you or members of your family heard artillery shells, drone strikes, or 














Q47. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too 
careful in dealing with people? 
1 = most people can be trusted. 
2 = can’t be too careful. 
 
Q48. Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or 
would they try to be fair? 
1 = would take advantage of you. 
2 = would try to be fair 
 
Q49. Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just 
looking out for themselves? 
1 = Try to be helpful. 
2 = Looking out for themselves. 
 
Q50. I like to help others. 
5 = Strongly agree 
4 = Agree 
3 = Undecided 
2 = Disagree 
1 = Strongly disagree 
 
Q51. I trust others. 
5 = Strongly agree 
4 = Agree 
3 = Undecided 
2 = Disagree 
1 = Strongly disagree 
 
Q52. When dealing with strangers, one is better off using caution before trusting them. 
5 = Strongly agree 
4 = Agree 
3 = Undecided 
2 = Disagree 
1 = Strongly disagree 
 
Q53. How often have you benefited from the generosity of a person you did not know? 
5 = Very often 
4 = Often 
3 = Sometimes 
2 = Rarely 











Q54. How often do you leave your house or car door unlocked? 
5 = Very often 
4 = Often 
3 = Sometimes 
2 = Rarely 
1 = Never 
 
Q55. How often do you lend personal possessions other than money to others? 
5 = Very often 
4 = Often 
3 = Sometimes 
2 = Rarely 
1 = Never 
 
Q56. Taking all things together, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? 
5 = Very satisfied 
4 = Satisfied 
3 = Neutral 
2 = Unsatisfied 
1 = Very unsatisfied 
 
Q57. Overall, how satisfied are you with your life at home these days? 
5 = Very satisfied 
4 = Satisfied 
3 = Neutral 
2 = Unsatisfied 
1 = Very unsatisfied 
 
Q58. Overall, how satisfied are you with your present job these days? 
5 = Very satisfied 
4 = Satisfied 
3 = Neutral 
2 = Unsatisfied 
1 = Very unsatisfied 
 
Q59. Overall, how satisfied are you with your present health? 
5 = Very satisfied 
4 = Satisfied 
3 = Neutral 
2 = Unsatisfied 












Q60. Overall, how satisfied are you with the community in which you live these days? 
5 = Very satisfied 
4 = Satisfied 
3 = Neutral 
2 = Unsatisfied 
1 = Very unsatisfied 
 
Q60b. In the past 3 months, did you or someone in your family go an entire day without eating, 
for reason other than for religious fasting? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
Q60c. If “yes” to Q60b., for how many days? 
 
Q60d. In the past 3 months, has there been a time when you or a dependent family member 
needed health care but could not obtain it because of cost? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
Q60e. In the past 3 months, has there been a time when you or a dependent family member 
needed health care but could not obtain it because you were unable to travel? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
Q60f. If “yes” to Q60d. why you or a dependent family member was unable to travel to obtain 
health care? 
1 = Patient was too weak 
2 = There was no vehicle available 
3 = Fare was too high 
4 = Route was problematic 
5 = No one to accompany the patient 
6 = Other 
 
Q60g. You could not access healthcare with which of the following? 
1 = Doctor 
2 = Nurse 
3 = LHV 
4 = Hakeem 
5 = Dai 
6 = Other desi health provider 
7 = Village hospital 
8 = District hospital 
 
Q60h. Which of the following doctors have you visited in the past three month? 
1 = Doctor 






3 = LHV 
4 = Hakeem 
5 = Dai 
6 = Other desi health provider 
 
Q61. Have you ever used Internet or Mobile to access any service offered by government? 
1 = Yes (go to Q63.) 
2 = No (go to Q62.) 
 
Q62. Why you have not used these Internet or Mobile Services? 
1 = I’m illiterate 
2 = I’m shy/afraid of these services 
3 = I don’t know about these services 
4 = I don’t have Internet or Mobile to use these services 
5 = I don’t know how to use these services online or on mobile 
6 = these services are too complicated 
7 = these services are in English, which is difficult 
8 = I tried but mobile services/ website had too many problems 
9 = these services are ridiculous 
 
Q63. Where did you get to know about the above services? 
1 = Radio 
2 = T.V. 
3 = Newspaper 
4 = Government official 
5 = NGOs 
6 = Hujra 
7 = Friend or family 
8 = other 
 
Region 
1 = KPK 























Appendix B: Telephone survey (KPK and FATA) questionnaire: 
 
Q1. Taking all things together, how satisfied are you with your life these days? 
5 = very satisfied 
4 = satisfied 
3 = neutral 
2 = dissatisfied 
1 = very dissatisfied 
 
Q2. Do you trust others? 
5 = strongly agree 
4 = agree 
3 = undecided 
2 = disagree 
1 = strongly disagree 
 
Q3. Are you satisfied with the quality of the services provided by the local dist or political 
administration? 
5 = strongly agree 
4 = agree 
3 = undecided 
2 = disagree 
1 = strongly disagree 
 
Q4. What is your age (years)? 
1 = < 15 
2 = 15 – 18 
3= 19 – 25 
4 = 26 – 35 
5 = 36 – 45 
6 = 46 – 55 
7 = 56 – 65 
8 = 66 – 75 
9 > 75 
 
Q5. Gender 
1 = male 
2 = female 
 
Q6. Marital status 
1 = single 
2 = married 
3 = widowed 





Q7. Number of children 




1 = Illiterate 
2 = Primary school 
3= Middle school 
4 = Matric 
5 = Intermediate 
6 = Graduate 
7 = Master’s degree 
8 = Engineer 
9 = Doctor 
10 = Lawyer 
11 = Chartered Accountant 
12 = Others 
 
Region 
1 = KPK 
2 = FATA 
 
 
Table C1: Experimental Design – KPK Messaging Campaign 








Control Group     
Tangi 411,000 0 0 0 
Haripur 728,000 0 0 0 
Lakki 790,000 0 0 0 
Oghi 248,000 0 0 0 
Martoong 930,000 0 0 0 
Wari S/D 366,000 0 0 0 
Treatment 1     
Abbottabad 863,784 14,101 10,343 x 
Chitral S/D 270,000 4,487 3,243 x 
B Daud Shah 156,000 3,278 2,210 x 
Jandool 317,000 5,456 4,011 x 
Mardan 1,661,000 27,297 18,375 x 
Puran 130,000 2,324 1,983 x 
Treatment 2     
Havelian 297,216 5,003 3,922 0 
Mastuj S/D 197,000 3,245 2,591 0 
Karak 264,000 4,589 3,491 0 
Temergara 885,000 16,331 10,611 0 
Takht Bai 639,000 11,360 7,344 0 
Lahore 475,000 8,178 5,734 0 
Treatment 3     
Bannu 1,033,000 0 11,639 x 
D.I. Khan 832,000 0 10,429 x 
Takht-e-Nasrati 284,000 0 3,781 x 
Sam Ranizai 313,000 0 3,981 x 
Nowshera 1,355,000 0 15,699 x 
Swabi 1,133,000 0 13,243 x 
Treatment 4     
Allai 175,000 3,071 0 x 
Kulachi 246,000 4,101 0 x 
Kohat 919,000 15,570 0 x 
Swat Ranizai 439,000 7,709 0 x 
Peshawar 3,452,000 56,785 0 x 
Matta 410,000 6,965 0 x 
Treatment 5     
Battagram 267,000 4,540 0 0 
Paharpur 319,000 5,677 0 0 
Dassu S/D 189,000 3,489 0 0 
Balakot 293,000 5,421 0 0 
Alpuri 277,000 4,501 0 0 
Swat 1,680,000 30,844 0 0 
 
 
Treatment 6     
Tank 382,000 0 4,862 0 
Besham 101,000 0 1,582 0 
Buner 904,000 0 10,874 0 
Hangu 514,000 0 6,102 0 
Palas S/D 215,000 0 2,891 0 
F.R. Kaladhaka 338,000 0 4,211 0 
Treatment 7     
Charsadda 1,171,000 0 0 x 
Ghazi 163,000 0 0 x 
Pattan S/D 124,000 0 0 x 
Mansehira 808,000 0 0 x 
Chakisar 111,000 0 0 x 
Dir S/D 508,000 0 0 x 
 
 





# of Messages 
Delivered 
# of Text 
Replies 
Bajaur Agency     
Khar Group 1 597,350 16,519 826 
Nawagai Group 1 526,791 37,652 1,883 
Mohmand Agency     
Lower Mohmand Group 2 244,019 16,142 807 
Upper Mohmand Control    
Kyhber Agency     
Jamrud Group 2 149,175 21,336 1,067 
Landi Kotal Control    
Bara Control    
Orakzai Agency     
Lower Orakzai Group 1 167,580 25,187 1,259 
Upper Orakzai Control    
Kurram Agency     
Lower Kurram Group 2 93,010 12,141 607 
Central Kurram Control    
Upper Kurram Control    
North Warziristan Agency     
Mir Ali Control    
Miranshah Control    
Razmak Control    
South Warziristan Agency     
Ladha Control    
Sarwakai Control    
Wana Control    
FR Peshawar Control    
FR Kohat Group 2 121,963 20,581 1,029 
FR Bannu – Mir Ali Control    
FR Lakki Marwat Group 1 9,634 442 22 
FR Tank – Jandola Control    
FR Dera Ismail Khan Control    
 
